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Economics and Net Energy Analysis:
Is A New Analytical Techniaue
Needed for Energy Decision Making?
William J. Kruvant, Ph.D.
U.S. General Accounting Office *
Washington, D.C.
The paper attempts to evaluate the claims of Net
Energy Analysis (NEA) against those of economics in
a reasonably comprehensive way. The principal pro
blems of NEA concern system boundaries, aggregation
across fuels, valuing external effects, valuing
human labor and valuing time. These problems seri
ously limit the contribution Net Energy Analysis
can make to allocation decisions, and allocation
Is the central problem of energy policy.

I
Solving, or at least alleviating, our "energy pro
blem" means allocating resources among alternative
programs and technologies in such a way as to m a x 
imize net social benefits. In energy, as in most
policy areas, the choice is usually not "all-ornothing" but rather "more-or-less." How much more
Insulation should be required in buildings above
current standards? How much less fuel efficiency
Is Implied by tighter auto emissions standards?
Which of the many types of nuclear power reactors
1s best? All these more-or-less questions are
allocation questions.

do not provide an adequate des
cription of the resources needed
for their production. Where there
are not shortages of any inputs to
the production system financial
analysis provides a convenient
decision-making framework.
However, if one input becomes
scarce, then the implicit
assumption of substitutibility,
inherent in financial systems
analysis, leads to false con
clusions." (1 )
Others go farther.
Wade Rowland made a plea for completely changing the
way we look at productive activity when he wrote:

This paper compares how Net Energy Analysis and
economics— the technique traditionally associated
with allocation-address allocation questions. The
allocation issue is the heart of our "energy pro
blem," and if NEA is not helpful on allocation it
1s not helpful on the central questions of energy
policy.

"What we are in need of, then,
is a replacement for our present
system of economic thought, a re
placement that will not be at odds
with our richest fund of wisdom
and so will not lead us into
renewed conflict with our natural
environment.
In other words, what
is needed is a new economic system
that will operate within the house
rules of the planet as we understand
them, in accordance with rather than
is opposition to the laws of ecology." (2 )

A number of scientists and commentators believe
that an NEA (direct examination of energy accounts
In energy terms) approach is needed to supplement,
or even replace, present analytical techniques that
deal with allocation questions. For example,
Peter Chapman has stated:

In one way this paper is itself addressing an allo
cative issue: What is the value of NEA and does it
add anything significant to the knowledge obtain
able by economic analysis? To get an answer to this
question, we examine how NEA and economics analyze
choice and evaluate NEA's possible contribution.
The reader must realize that any evaluation is some
what provisional. Studies using NEA have only been
produced for about five years and many of the rough

"...there has been a growing
realization that the financial
costs of materials and products
*

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the
U.S. General Accounting Office.
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edges energetics has may be smoothed in the future.
As of today, however, NEA has little to offer the
policy analyst or decision maker.
II
Net Energy Analysis is a straightforward technique
because it is based on a straightforward idea. As
one well-known practitioner put it, "Net energy has
been defined as the amount of energy that remains
for consumer use after the costs of finding, pro
ducing, upgrading, and delivering the energy have
been paid." (3)
Although there are many ways to analyze specific
energy paths from primary resources to final use,
they are all more or less complicated variants of
the following chart: (Figure 1)

Clearly, the net energy produced depends on the
size of the physical and thermodynamic losses along
with the "energy subsidies." The physical and
thermodynamic losses are fairly obvious. They
would include the energy lost as waste heat in an
electric powerplant, the unrecovered coal left in
the mine, and the energy lost in the conversion of
oil shale to crude petroleum.
"Energy subsidy" is
largely what NEA is all about.
It is the amount of
produced energy which must be reinvested in order
to deliver energy to consumers. Such subsidies
are ubiquitous. They encompass such things as the
amount oil which must be converted to electricity
which is used to run oil refineries; the amount of
coal used to generate the electricity which powers
a uranium enrichment plant; or the amount of energy
needed to produce and transport drilling equipment
to the oil field.

An example may make this clearer. The above illu
stration (Figure 2) supplies estimates of the BTU's
needed to produce 1,000 BTU's of strip mined coal.
Starting with 1,275.4 BTU of coal in the ground,.
275.4 BTU are lost in the mining, preparation, and
transportation processes while 18 BTU is the amount
of energy used in operating the mine plus the
amount used in the form of machinery and other pnysical capital which is consumed. (4) The 18 BTU's
are the energy subsidy.
Another fact which can be gleaned from the flow
chart is that although based on physical quantities
and thermodynamic relationships, the net energy
yield from a particular process is neither fixed
nor will it necessarily fall with increasing in
accessibility or resource base dilution. This is
because technological change can alter the relation
ship among the primary energy input, the physical
and thermodynamic losses and the energy subsidy.
For example, improved geologic profiles may in
crease the success rate for oil drilling. If the
greater success rate offsets the declining acces
sibility of deposits, the energy subsidy would be
approximately constant despite the decreased acces
sibility.
Thus, when commentators say that NEA deals with un
changing physical facts while economics deals with
constantly changing prices, this should not be
interpreted to mean that a net energy ratio will
not change or must constantly fall as resources
become scarcer. Unless specifically stated to the
contrary, both NEA and economic analysis share the
same ceteris paribus assumption--that technology
does not change.
The most common NEA technique is called process
analysis. This consists of following the energy
flows of a well-defined productive pathway from
primary resources through to consumption. The
pathway is usually called the process or trajec
tory. Four steps comprise a process analysis:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Specification of the particular system
(usually an energy supply system) for
study,
Specification of what energy expend
itures are to be included in the system,
Specification of the larger system
(country, region, present, future) with
in which the subject energy supply or
other system is to be evaluated,
Specification of some measure of quan
tity and quality of energy so that the
various energies used directly or em
bodied in other inputs can be aggre
gated for comparison with alterna
tives. (5)

Process analysis is also illustrated in Figure 1.
This applies to any system chosen for study and
shows the total inputs of primary energy and
energy subsidy. Unfortunately, energy subsidy is
not simply the direct and indirect energy inputs
which are readily apparent. For example, if we
wish to analyze electric power production, we
obviously should count the fuels and electricity
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used in running the plant such as the electricity
to light it, the space heating the cooling fuels,
the fuels used in transporting the coal, etc. We
would also count the energy used in the steel, con
crete, aluminum, rubber, plastic and other materials
which went into powerplant's construction and de
preciate them over the life of the plant. On
further thought we might want to count the fuels
and electricity which were produced and used at
those plants; and going still farther back, we
might want to count the energy and fuels used in
the materials which went into constructing those
plants. One can go on, but this is a obviously a
question of infinite regress. The question is,
where do we draw the line? Drawing this line ac
tually defines the process and is one of the most
difficult tasks of the analyst. This problem, the
"system boundary" problem, is discussed later. Such
an analysis can be carried out for any number of
fuel supply systems and the results compared. The
results will then guide decision-making since pro
cesses which produce more net energy are presumably
more desirable.
How important are energy subsidies in practice?
Table 1 gives subsidy estimates for producing var
ious fossil fuels, electric power from those same
fuels and from uranium. The subsidy required for
fuel production is very low, and even when con-

Ill
Economic analysis strives to derive rules for so
cially optimal allocation decisions. In a fully
competitive economy, entrepreneurs' private invest
ment decisions would be socially optimal in most
cases. In the other cases, government intervention
either in the form of direct provision of goods and
services (defense, fire protection, city streets,
etc.) or tax and subsidy policies can correct sit
uations where private markets generate suboptimal
decisions.
Of course, we do not have a fully competitive ecoomy and the energy sector is hardly fully competi
tive. Consequently, private economic decisions are
not likely to lead to maximum social benefits.
Since the government has the responsibility to pro
mote the general welfare and since it is involved
more or less directly in most major energy develop
ments, it would certainly behoove government to
apply social cost and social benefit criteria to
energy decisions.
How would the government decide what the social
worth of a proposed project is? Such a calculation
would involve measuring social benefit and social
cost and if the former was greater, using some rule
to decide if the difference is large enough to make
the project worthwhile. Economy-wide it would mean
allocating resources in such a way as to maximize
net social benefits.
Then how to measure benefits? If we assume that
the value of a good or service to a consumer re
flects the amount he or she spent on it, there is
a measuring stick at hand. This is called "con
sumers' surplus" and it is the difference between
actual price and the amount each consumer was
willing to pay for the quantity actually purchased.
A little reflection will show that consumers' sur
plus is the measure of social benefit. Let us say
the government wished to build a hydroelectric dam.
Ignoring for the moment all other benefits except
electricity generated (flood control, recreation)
the electricity would be sold at the usual market
price. The gross social benefit of this power
would then simply be all value attached to the
electricity consumed by each buyer. Since the
amount of money paid by each of these buyers cannot
now be spent on other things, the net social bene
fit derived is equal to the gross benefit minus
the amount of consumption of other things which had
to be foregone. This net benefit is obviously the
consumers' surplus. (6)

*Underground mine and minemouth plant, on-site
power generation for conversion plant power.
Source: Alton Frabetti, et. a l ., A Study to Develq)
Energy Estimates of Merit for Selected
Fuel Technologies. East Sandwich, Mass.,
development Sciences, Inc., 9/75.
pp. 222-223.
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If the consumers' surplus can be identified with
social benefit, how are we to count social cost?
This is conceptually straightforward. Economists
consider the alternative uses of resources as the
appropriate measure of such costs? If there were
two projects proposed and there were only enough
resources to do one of them, the social cost of
doing one is the amount of return society must fore
go in choosing not to do the other. If we are con
sidering alternative public projects, the correct
procedure would be to rank the alternatives in terms

of their net returns to find which is most desir
able, and then compare this ranking to a use for
these resources in the private sector* ( 7) This
way we find out which public project is most ad
vantageous and which public project, if any, should
be done given that the resources could be used in
the private sector.
Once the social costs and benefits of alternative
projects have been added up, their flow in time
must be considered.
In fact, there is really no
way to add them at all without regard for time
factor.
The way we assign a time value to money today is
our "time preference" and is reflected in a dis
count rate. For example, if the discount rate
were 10 percent, we would give only $18*18 now to
get $20 after one year. If the discount rate were
5 percent, we would give $19.05 for $20 a year
hence. This example brings out an important con
sequence of alternative discount rates— high rates
favor quick payoff projects because we are willing
to give only a small amount for returns far in the
future, while low discount rates favor projects
which pay off slower.
The actual process of ranking a set of alternative
projects is rather complicated, but can be stated
briefly here to give the reader a feel for how it
is done. ( 8 ) The costs and benefits which will
accrue from each project in each year are calcula
ted. A discount rate is then chosen and the cost
and benefit streams discounted and "normalized."
Normalization is simply reducing all projects to
a cannon basic outlay, a common investment life
and a specification of investments to be made with
the funds generated by the project. The excess of
benefits over costs is noted and those which have
net benefits larger than can be gotten in the pri
vate sector are ranked on a list. Finally, pro
jects are chosen in order of greatest net benefit
until the available investable funds are ex
hausted.*
Using an appropriate discount rate is important
since the discount rate largely determines which
projects will be undertaken. Where does such a
rate come from? Although this is a rather complex
theoretical issue, in practice it proves to be
less serious.** It turns out that the market rate
of interest is usually reasonable, and the issue
often does not arise because many governments de
cide on a rate through the political process.
This is legitimate since the discount rate can be
thought of as an expression of national policy on
matters of public investment. (12) Others, in
cluding ours, base their discount rate on the
interest rates they must pay on long term govern
ment borrowing. (13) All in all, the need for
discount rates other than the market rate of
*

**

interest is not as pressing as seemed at first
sight.
IV
One of the more difficult problems involved in
choosing among alternative energy projects— or even
whether to build any energy producing facility at
all— is the issue of the project's external effects.
These effects must be understood in some detail be
cause they loom so large in the issues of energy
development and use. Since the type of externality
which is most often debated in connection with
energy is air and water pollution the examples here
will concern these kinds of problems. However, the
analysis can be easily extended to cover any type
of external effect.
A spillover occurs when the actions of one economic
actor (firm, consumer or government) directly af
fects the production or welfare of another. These
effects must be direct in order to exclude market
transactions— buying and selling or a change in the
value of existing assets— among the actors. Water
pollution is an obvious example here, the waste
discharge by a plant upstream can cause expensive
adjustments by industries and municipalities down
stream who must now clean up the water they use
which used to be pure.
Spillovers associated with energy production and
consumption are both ubiquitous and largely nega
tive. On the production side are such things as
erosion and acid runoff from coal stripmining,
spills from offshore oil production and tanker
transportation, sulfur oxide and particulate
emissions from coal-fired powerplants and radiation
from nuclear ones, and so forth. The seriousness
of these spillovers is illustrated by the often
vehement opposition which they arouse in the com
munities they damage.
The way to actually value the effects of such spill
overs is to try to measure the damage people per
ceive being done to their welfare. This technique,
called compensating variation, measures the amount
of money compensation it would take to restore a
citizen to the level of wellbeing he was at before
the spillover took place. The sum of compensating
variations of the individuals affected is the meas
ure of the damage caused by the spillover. (14)
If the sum of compensating variations is negative,
that is if those who suffer from the externalities
place a higher value on their suffering than do
those who benefit from whatever useful externalities
the project generates (boating on a lake created by
a hydroelectric dam, for instance), then this value
must be included as part of project cost.
Once all spillovers have been duly counted, the
analyst has a full social cost account.
If, on the

This procedure guarantees that projects will be ranked consistently among the three most commonly used
criteria: absolute amount of excess benefits, excess benefit to cost ratio, or the internal rate of
return. ( 9)
For those interested in the discount rate question, see citations (10) and (ll).
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basis of this account, the government decided to go
ahead with the project, the question is how much of
the negative spillovers should be corrected? There
are essentially three ways to do this: 1) Output
can be reduced until the social benefit of the last
unit of product equals the social cost of that out
put, 2) Pollution preventing devices can be in
stalled up to the point where the resulting increase
in social benefit is counterbalanced by the cost
of one more unit of hardware (this will have the
incidental effect of increasing output because
there is less pollution per unit), 3) Polluters can
indemnify victims who leave the spillover area up
the point where the benefits of moving are equal to
moving costs. (15)
To see how this works, it will be useful to go
through a simple example. (16) The example is il
lustrated in the following graph:
Figure 3

The example illustrates the pollution control de
vice installation case, but the other cases can be
analyzed similarly. In fact, the optimal amount of
pollution reduction will differ according to which
method is chosen and if combinations of the three
are used, the pollution reduction will be greater
than if any single one was used exclusively. (17)
The crucial quantity in valuing spillovers, then,
is the sum— usually negative for energy projects
because adverse spillovers normally predominate
here--of the compensating variations. This is
all well and good, but where are we to find this
information? We cannot look to the economic
(narket) system itself because the very nature of
a spillover is that it takes place outside market
transactions. The most obvious way to find out how
much people value an amenity which will be destoyed by an energy project--white water canoeing
and trout fishing ruined by building a hydroelectric
dam--is to ask (poll) them. Polling runs into pro
blems, though. For example, who should be polled?
Only people who have used the river? People who
may use the river in the future? How does one iden
tify the total number in any such group? Who is to
do the polling and under what controls? Possibly
more important, if people will know why they are
being polled, they, will have an incentive to ex
aggerate the value of the amenity to themselves.
To quote a very high value costs them nothing, and
the higher the value they quote the greater the
chance that the amenity will not be destroyed.
These difficulties in finding adequate information
go a long way to explain why economists have not
paid much real attention to spillover effects un
til recently, and they still are a considerable
barrier to finding the true social cost-benefit
relationship.
If spillovers are to be accounted for accurately in
economic transactions, the most obvious way is to
include them in the market price of the product.
If this cannot be done through excise taxes or
some other way, accounting prices reflecting the
true cost of the product should be used for planning
purposes. The same goes for prices which are dis
torted by imperfect competition or government
regulation of industry. Using accounting prices
counters the objection of some energy analysts
that since price plays such an important part in
economic calculation, and since energy prices are
obviously not set by the free play of supply and
demand, economic calculations will not reveal true
scarcities.

Here, D'D shows the marginal social damage of pol
lution at increasing levels of spillover. OB is
the initial amount of pollution while A'A shows the
marginal cost of pollution abatement. These curves
follow the common observations that as pollution
rises the damage it causes mounts more than pro
portionally, and that it becomes progressively more
expensive to clean up the remaining pollution at
successively higher levels of control. The diagram
clearly implies that pollution should be reduced
to where the marginal reduction in pollution damage
is equal to the marginal increase in pollution
abatement costs; that is, pollution should be re
duced from OB to OE.

How much help does NEA provide in spillover
evaluation? Unfortunately, rather little. For
example, NEA provides a valuable piece of informa
tion that allows directly from process analysis.
When examining a process, one immediately knows the
amount of energy spillover by subtracting the gross
energy input from the net energy output. By the
First Law of Thermodynamics energy cannot be des
troyed, so if it is not part of the output, it must
have been spun off by the process.

This result can be achieved by levying a tax of BF
dollars per unit of pollution because at that tax
rate it is cheaper to reduce the amount of pollu
tion than pay the tax up the amount OE.

This is a good first step, but it is still a long
way to a full accounting of spillover costs.

687

Besides the amount of the spillover we need to know
who it hurts and how much it hurts them. We must
place a value on the spillover. A large energy
spillover in the form of, say, waste heat dis
persed over many square miles of sparsely inhab
ited countryside is less damaging than a smaller
but more concentrated emission of sulfur dioxide
from a city powerplant. Because the spillover is
expressed in BTU terms, there is no way of comparing
the toxicity of various pollutants. There is also
no way of tracing spillovers once they leave the
process— although this can be done by other methods.
Most important, there is no way to value the dam
age done to victims since, as will be shown, aggretating BTU's is meaningless.
Problems in Energetics
The system boundary problem
There are a number of problems in implementing the
process analysis steps listed earlier, and one of
the most serious is the "system boundary problem"
The question is: What should be counted as a cost
in the energy system under study? Another way of
asking the question is: Where is the boundary bet
ween supply and demand? Many authors take the
seemingly practical and agnostic position that the
place to draw the boundary depends on the question
being asked. (18) The energy costs, and thus the
boundaries, which might be considered relevant in
coal production could be:
1.

All the fossil fuels which were bought
and used to produce and transport the coal,

2.

All these fuels plus any electricity gen
erated by nuclear and hydro power and any
coal used directly at the mine,

3.

All the above plus the amount of coal ren
dered unrecoverable by the mining pro
cess. (19)

While this seems a practical approach, one apparental free of arbitrary rules that get in the way
of appropriate analysis, it brings along some ser
ious problems. One of the less serious errors in
volves the risk of leaving out some important in
direct energy inputs by stopping the quantification
process too soon. This is "truncation error." (20)
Two other problems with process analysis are inher
ent and can the cause of highly ambiguous results.
The first problem arises because process analysis
isolates one technology from all others and also
from cost changes. The problem is inherent because
process analysis must make these isolations or it
would not be an evaluation of a specific technology.
Let us take an example. (21) The most common net
energy ratio is E/S, energy produced divided by
the energy subsidy. Let E = 100 and S = 12. This
would make the net energy ratio 100/12 = 8.3 and
net energy output (N) = 88 . This puts the system
boundary between the production facility and sale
of the product to a processor or final demand.
Now, suppose that 9 units of output were diverted
to produce electricity which was generated and
used internally. This would lower the gross
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output to 91 ( 1 0 0 - 9 ) and the energy subsidy to
3 because these 9 units no longer cross the system
boundary to be fed back into the process.
E/S is
now 30.3 even though N is still 88 . Thus, a given
process need not yield a unique net energy ratio.
Of course, N is still 88 ; but the amount of net out
put is clearly dependent on the scale of the pro
cess. By simply building a larger plant, N will be
larger even though the technology has not changed.
Another example of how the system boundary affects
the size of the subsidy and so the net energy ratio
is contained in Table 1. The oil from shale pro
duction case shows that the energy subsidy is 39
BTU's if electricity is generated at the shale com
plex and 113 BTU's if generated elsewhere. The net
energy ratios are 25.6 and 8 .8 , respectively. This
great discrepancy arises because the study's authors
drew the system boundary at the plant gate. If the
boundary were drawn around the entire shale oil pro
cess, it would make no difference whether the elec
tricity was generated on or off the shale oil re
finery site and the only subsidy that could be
calculated would be 39 BTU's giving a net energy
ratio of 25.6. These examples show that even though
net energy analysis is based on unchanging physical
facts, the technique itself cannot give the un
ambiguous answer one would expect from such a solid
base.
The second boundary problem arises because there are
two plausible but radically different views which
can be taken of what are appropriate energy costs
and benefits. (22) Taking a specific process, one
reasonable place to draw a boundary is between it
and the rest of the economy (GNP). This is equiva
lent to counting energy subsidies as "goods" rather
than costs of the system. Specifically, if the
system were oil from shale, the energy used to build
new towns for the oil shale workers, the energy
used to train these workers in the new technology,
treat their occupational accidents and diseases,
etc., would all be counted as goods— that is, as
additions to GNP. Such a view would be consistent
with input/output analysis and ordinary national
income accounting.
This view is strongly contradicted by many net
energy analysts. They would count all such expen
ditures, and often the subsidies provided by in
vestment which replaces services rendered by the
environment as costs. (23) Taking this slant means
that the size of calculated energy subsidies will be
much larger than under the first scheme. Tracing
such costs can also become quite complicated. For
example, let us say an oil shale refining plant is
built in a farming area. Under the view which
counts the energy loss attendent on the degradation
of ecological capital, one could follow this chain
of events: The facility is constructed and water
is diverted to service it. This diversion lowers
the quantity and quality of water available to
farmers which in turn leads to less plant cover on
their land and greater soil erosion. To the degree
that this results in reduced energy production
(e.g., energy loss through less conversion of sun
light to food) this must be reckoned as a cost and
charged against the energy content of the shaleoil .

Drawing the system boundary based on either of the
above views can be readily defended. A critic of
a line between the process and the rest of GNP will
say that such a procedure greatly overstates the
benefits of energy projects by counting all their
attendant activities as "goods", additions to GNP,
while in reality many of them represent losses in
human health, happiness or socially useful capital
investment (installation of pollution control
equipment rather than building recreational facil
ities). A critic of identifying the system bound
ary with all possible energy subsidies could
contend that many of the "costs" identified in this
way are indeed benefits. Is not new housing for
the shale workers a social benefit? The schools
for their children? The shopping centers where
they buy the things they need? Clearly, these two
views are irreconcilable and any analysis done
using one will be open to trenchant criticism from
those espousing the other.
It may be that net en
ergy analysis will one day come to some compromise
between the two views. Until then, results using
either will necessarily be ambiguous.

fuels used times the number of uses of each) is not
available although suitably detailed 1/0 tables
could supply it. Even if available it would be of
dubious value because such data would still not take
into account other crucial qualities of different
energy sources such as their relative convenience
and cleanliness. (24)
Energy quality factors based on the amount of energy
needed to convert one energy form to another have
also been suggested. These factors show, for
example, that it takes 3.6 kilocalories of coal to
get 1 kilocalorie of electricity or 7,200 kilo
calories of sunlight to get that same kilocalorie
of electricity. (25) The technical details of such
claculations are more or less ingenious, but the
product does not get us very far. These "energy
quality" factors are open to much the same objec
tion as work content of fuels. They simply do not
reflect the differential social value that society
ascribes to them, a value which goes far beyond
their physical properties. Not only is this true,
it is right. We do not value energy in itself but
for what it can do to make our lives better. Value
is after all social and not a physical phenomenon
and any theory which attempts to get at the value
of things to human beings without reference to the
feelings, preferences or needs of human beings can
never be of much use.

Aggregation
Net energy analysts confront a serious "adding up"
or aggregation problem in both their theoretical
and practical work. Processes typically use a
variety of fuels as inputs and often produce a
range of distinct products. The problem is how to
combine the energies represented by the various
fuels. Two fuels with the same heat content do not
necessarily have the same value to either producers
or consumers.
Economics aggregates by using
prices.
If oil is at $12 a barrel and we have 5
barrels, and coal is at $20 a ton and we have 10
tons, the value of the oil is $60, the value of
the coal is $200 and the total value represented
by the two fuels is $260. This certainly seems
simple enough, and is equivalent to the statement
that a thing sells for what it is worth. When we
enter a net energy analysis, things aren't so
simple. The most obvious measure for comparing is
heat content, but this is obviously inadequate. A
million BTU's of natural gas is more valuable than
a million BTU's of coal; a million BTU's of elec
tricity is more valuable than a million BTU's of
No. 6 fuel oil used in electricity generation.

There is, of course, one other alternative in the
aggregation mess--don't aggregate at all. Rejec
tion of aggregation would tell us to simply list the
amounts of the various fuels used as inputs, the
amount of fuel coming out as production, and the
amounts of other inputs and outputs which are inci
dental to the process in question. This is no
solution at all. Not only would one wind up with a
more or less lengthy list of non-comparable quan
tities, but there would be no way to compare the
results generated by one process with those genera
ted by another. The aggregation problem is, and
will probably remain one of the most thorny problems
faced by NEA.
The Energy Value of Labor

If heat equivalence cannot give us a unit to use in
aggregation, what about an energy quality measure?
Two such measures suggest themselves immediately:
The ability to do work and the amount of energy it
takes to convert one type of fuel to another. The
ability to do work is superficially appealing; it
is an invariant quality and can be calculated for
any energy source. However, the actual— as opposed
to theoretical— amount of work which is gotten from
a particular energy source varies tremendously de
pending on the end use of the fuel. Thus, if one
were to use ability to do work as a unit for aggre
gation, one would need to know the actual Second
Law of Thermodynamics efficiencies of each fuel in
all its end uses. These efficiencies could then
be used as weights which, when multiplied by the
amount of fuel used, would give us summable quan
tities. Such incredibly detailed knowledge (all
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One aspect of the aggregation problem which de-^
serves special mention is: What energy value, if
any, should be put on human labor? This is not a
piddling question. In 1976 labor income made up
71 percent of U.S. national income. (26) Labor
inputs are bound to be an important part of any
energy system.
Three solutions have been proposed to deal with this
problem. One solution is to simply ignore any en
ergy value that labor might contribute and calcu
late labor requirements separately.
(27) Another
view would be to exclude all workers' normal con
sumption of goods and services and include only
the energy value of those items which were directly
caused by their work in the energy supply system
(special training for coal miners, new towns built
for shale oil workers, or increased beer consump
tion from working deep in a hot mine). ( 2^
Lastly, if one takes the position that the purpose
of society, like any organism, is to perpetuate

itself; all energy consumed by workers and even
their families are inputs into this process of self
perpetuation. (29)
The first course, ignoring the problem, is simply
an admission of failure. Unfortunately, the sec
ond and third approaches are no less barren. Dis
regarding the many estimation problems that would
arise, the fact is that assigning an energy value
to labor which is based on its energy consumption
rather than its energy production is silly.
Is a
coal miner, who presumeably consumes a great deal
of energy to keep up his muscular strength to be
valued more than the president of the coal company
who probably leads a sedentary existence and must
diet all the time? Obviously, labor is valued
in any production process for its productivity,
and the amount of energy consumed by a particular
worker bears no necessary relationship to the
social value of their labor. There is simply no
way to add up the labor of different kinds of
workers in energy terms. The possibility of attri
buting a meaningful energy value to labor is a
mirage.
NEA and Intertemporal Choice
Economic analysis allocates resources over time by
comparing costs and benefits reduced to present
values via a discount rate. Since energy projects
usually have long lives, an appropriate discount
rate is particularly important for evaluating them.
If NEA is to be a useful investment decision tool,
it must have a way to solve the intertemporal
allocation problem. Unfortunately, NEA cannot
answer the question: How much is a BTU worth today
compared with a BTU tomorrow (or next year or to
the next generation)?
Opinions on an energy discount rate are sharply
divided. Some authors state that NEA is only good
for describing physical flows of energy and since
a discount rate is thrown up by society's value
system, NEA should stick to its strengths and leave
discounting to other analyses.
(30) Others take
a less extreme view. Normally, a positive dis
count rate is needed to allocate between consump
tion and investment. This goes for energy as much
as for anything else. However, there are two cir
cumstances where discounting would be undesirable:
Where we are dealing with depletible resources and
present consumption leaves less for future gen
erations (true for coal, gas, and oil but not for
sun and wind) and where an investment may cause
irreparable ecological— including human— damage in
the future (plutomium technology). This latter is
a matter of human rights rather than investment
criteria. (3 1 ) These two "exceptions" loom large
tn the ranqe of energy investment c h o i c e r But,
even if we admit there are areas where accounting
is dangerous, how do we solve the problem of what
projects are "better" when different ones have
different costs and benefits over their lives
and/or last for different amounts of time?
Below is an example of the consequences of not
discounting. Projects A and B, say alternative nu
clear reactors, have the same costs (tg - t2 ) and

outputs (t3 - tc) over the same years. The only
difference is that the construction costs are
distributed differently:
FIGURE 4
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Without discounting A and B are equivalent, at any
discount rate above zero, B is preferable to A.
If not, discounting is really adopting a zero dis
count rate, the results are clearly anomalous.
However, there are situations such as those above
where a rate of zero, or ven a negative rate, can
be defended philosophically. One must conclude
that energy analysts have divergent opinions on
the discounting question for a very good reason.
If they do not adopt a rate, nothing much can be
said about intertemporal allocation; if they do
adopt a rate, they can be criticized both for the
particular rate adopted and for placing a lesser
value on future than on present energy.
V
A plausible hypothetical example should help show
the practical problems of Net Energy Analysis. For
realism let us take an actual national policy:
making automobiles get more miles per gallon (mpg).
Mpg is closely related to auto weight, and since
aluminum is a lot lighter than steel, an obvious
way to lighten cars is to substitute aluminum parts
for steel ones. The problem arises because aluminun
is a more energy intensive metal than steel and so
continual additions of aluminum to autos could even
tually cost more BTU's in the metal making process
than gasoline BTU's saved in vehicle operation. The
question becomes— How much aluminum should be used
in cars?
There are really three ways to address this ques
tion: using NEA, cost-benefit analysis or admin
istrative requirement. The atininistrative require
ment is that cars must reach a specified mpg goal
by date "x". This approach ignores all secondary
effects, and since in this case the potential pro
blem of more energy being used in aluminum produc
tion than is saved in higher mpg is a secondary
effect, the administrative approach is not much
help.
The cost-benefit approach would be to calculate
the value of energy expended in aluminum and the
value of energy embodied in gasoline. Then to
derive the energy cost (in dollars) of boosting
mpg by adding aluminum and the energy savings (in
dollars) of higher mpg. A simple diagram (Figure 4)
shows the relationships. As mpg falls the amount
spent on gasoline rises; as the amount spent on
aluminum rises the mpg rises. According to this
analysis, aluminum should be added to the car until
the dollars spent on aluminum fabrication energy
equals the dollars saved in gasoline.
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Figure 4

many measures de^iqned to limit oil ourninq and en
courage coal burning— mostly used to generate elec
tricity. NEA, as we pointed out earlier, has no
system to value a BTU of electricity relative to a
BTU of gasoline. Thus, there is no reason to be
lieve that minimizing total BTU use by making the
net energy contribution of aluminum zero will give
us the most efficient use of gasoline. Indeed, by
implicitly valuing one BTU of electricity and one
BTU of gasoline equally, rather than according to
their social utility as reflected in their prices,
we almost guarantee that too little or too much
qasoline will be saved and too little or too much
aluminum will be used.
VI

Amounts spent on energy
in aluminum and gaso1 ine
Assuming that all prices accurately reflect social
costs, what has been accomplished by this analysis?
Total energy expenditure has been minimized, or, to
put it differently, the value of the total amount
of energy used per mile is as low as possible. Has
total energy use (the number of BTU's) been mini
mized? No. If a BTU of gasoline cost twice as
much as a BTU of electricity, fewer BTU's of gas
oline would be saved than if their prices were equal. Thus, the total amount spent on energy has
been minimized and the consumers have gotten the
cheapest energy cost per mile possible.
How would NEA attack the problem of how much alumi
num to use in cars? Energy analysis could be ap
plied to aluminum and gasoline, and aluminum would
be added to cars until the number of gasoline BTU's
saved equalled the number of--largely electricity—
BTU's used to make aluminum. Thus, the total num
ber of BTU's used in manufacture and operation of
cars would be minimized. While this analysis seems
even simpler and more relevant than the cost-bene
fit analysis, it is heir to several of the problems
discussed earlier. Objections would include:
1.

Spillovers are not taken into account.
If aluminum manufacture were highly
polluting, we would not know how much
environmental damage was being done by
using less gasoline and more metal.

2.

As we saw earlier, the implications for
labor cannot be brought out by NEA.

3.

The system boundary problem, particularly
the question of how to evaluate ecologi
cal costs would have to be solved.

Analytical techniques are descriptive, prescriptive,
or both. In fact, energetics probably has elements
of both although in varying proportions. Its des
criptive and prescriptive content are summarized
here and its value as an analytical tool is
sketched out.
The descriptive content of process analysis 1s
considerable. Unlike energy and economics I/O,
analysis of production trajectories using process
Analysis and economic analysis yield different
sorts of information. Like engineering, process
analysis starts with inputs, follows their trans
formation and records the output. Process analysis,
however, 1 s meant to be a policy tool and as such
lacks the complete Information that an engineer has
for a particular plant since 1 t has wider boun
daries than that single plant.
The economic tool closest to process analysis 1s
the production function. This shows the technical
relationship between inputs and outputs. Produc
tion functions are used not only to derive the
level of output from one combination of Inputs—
this would be roughly equivalent to process ana
lysis— but also how the inputs can be substituted
for another to produce a given output. Thus,
economic analysis emphasizes the alternatives for
reaching a production goal rather than a detailed
account of a specific process.
While energetics gives substantial descriptive In
formation, at least in certain areas, it 1 s much
less useful for suggesting recommendations to de
cisionmakers. The most Important questions faced
by energy planners are allocation questions such
as "What program should we choose and how much
should we put into it?" While understanding may be
enriched by describing a situation from several
viewpoints, the same cannot always be said of
prescription. Here, some methods usually give
unambiguously better results or, and this amounts
to the same thing, similar results with less ef
fort expended 1n obtaining them. The "big ques
tion" here 1s whether NEA will generate decisions
which will enable society to deal with energy
question optimally.

These three objections would all be important, but
the most critical problem turns out to be aggre
gation. Total BTU's used have been minimized, but
Is that what it really wanted? The answer, sur
prisingly, is "no". This country's conservation
goal is primarily reduction in petroleum use, not
electricity.
The President's Energy Plan contains

What are the barriers to good answers on alloca
tion questions and does NEA surmount them? The
system boundary problem 1 s a serious matter for
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NEA. Consistent boundaries cannot be drawn under
the present state of the art. Without plausible
and consistent system boundaries, any "net energy"
number will be partly a function of the analyst's
opinion rather than "unchanging physical facts" as
some practitioners should have us believe. Econo
mic analysis does not have a serious system bound
ary problem because the contributions of secondary
and tertiary inputs are automatically reflected
in market prices. Even if these prices are artifically controlled, a calculation of an ac
counting price to reflect true scarcity will remove
the problem.
Another particularly serious problem for NEA is
aggreation. We saw that there is no acceptable
way to add up the different forms of energy by
heat content, ability to do work or the energy
needed to transform one fuel into another.
If one
cannot aggregate, one cannot compare alternatives.
Without such comparisons, good allocation deci
sions are not possible. Economic analysis solves
the aggregation problem the same way as the
boundary problem--by using prices to derive com
parable units of account. As was the case in the
boundary problem, if prices do not reflect true
scarcities they must be corrected. However, if
corrections are possible then comparisons and in
formed allocation is also possible.
A similar problem and solution, or lack of one
under NEA, is how to value labor. Economics
states that a worker is worth what he produces and
wages are thought to reflect productivity at least
roughly. NEA, unfortunately, is quite unable to
make any sense of labor inputs. The suggestions
which have been made to "cost-out" labor in some
terms of the energy consumed by workers are, to
put it bluntly, foolish.
If the goal of policy is
to make peoples' lives better, then the inputs to
policy must make good sense of peoples' working
lives.
Economics has quite a way to go in this
regard; NEA is not the track.
Intertemporal allocation can only be done via a
device which rations resources between consump
tion and investment. Economics has trouble de
riving this discount rate exactly, but the range
of ambiguity is fairly small. Looking at the
world in energy terms injects much more uncer
tainty into the process of deriving an appro
priate discount rate. Clearly, any rate from zero
(or even less than zero) on up can be reasonably
justified. Since the streams of costs and benefits
of alternative projects over time are often quite
different, and since various discount rates will
rank projects differently, lack of a single rate
means that projects cannot be consistently ranked
in terms of their social benefits. Aggregation
problems prevent good allocation decisions in the
present; lack of a plausible discount rate prevents
good allocation decisions between present and
future.

theoretical approach to evaluating spillovers. The
practical problems in gathering information on
peoples' compensating variations are very large,
and direct polling may not be a practical solution.
Energetics is less useful in evaluating spillover’s.
The basic problems are that energetics does not
have a unit to use for quantification and has no way
of measuring the impact of the spillover.
What, then, can Net Energy Analysis contribute to
answering the big questions about energy policy
alternatives? As the rest of this paper has shown,
NEA does not, and probably cannot, give reasonable
answers to allocation questions.
Interestingly,
even some of NEA's most prominant advocates agree.
Chapman and Mortimer wrote in their seminal analysis
of nuclear power that, "In principle it seems wrong
to try to extend (net) energy analysis into the
realm of allocating resources...economics is still
the right tool to use..." (32)
What, then, is NEA good for? Process analysis has
some value as a description of physical relation
ships in energy systems. As with all good des
criptions, this can be suggestive. It may give us
ideas on what sectors or processes seem to use a
lot of energy and so might be good candidates for
conservation actions.* International comparisons
may be especially suggestive. Focussing on energy
subsidies gives a rough indication of the "energy
price" we pay for fuels, but this number has less
significance than it seems to at first sight. By
not saying anything about the real value that
various forms of energy have to consumers, an energy
subsidy number fudges one of energy's most impor
tant dimensions. By leaving out other inputs and
environmental spillovers an energy subsidy number
can give a false impression of real social cost and
social cost must guide social (and that includes
energy) policy.
NEA is not good for much. This conclusion is stated
somewhat reluctantly since our understanding of
energy choices using present techniques is hardly
perfect. Fresh approaches and methods would pro
bably be very useful in the energy area. However,
NEA seems to hold little promise--at least at its
present stage of development. Like other things
which compete for scarce research time and money,
analytical techniques have to "pay their way".
Presently, the costs of studying energy problems
via NEA probably outwelght the benefits such
studies produce. NEA can presently play only a
minor role in policy formulation and evaluation.

As we saw earlier, economic analysis has a coherent
*

Such description can be deceptive.
It is perfectly possible to have an 1ndus-ry which uses a "lot"
of energy and yet uses it much more efficiently than an industry which uses a "little" energy.
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